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Abstract 
In Denmark, only minor changes took place in the economic elite after the liberation. Retributions 
with economic collaborators were dealt with in the legal system, and business managers who had 
been involved in pro-German political activities during the occupation withdrew to their executive 
offices and kept a low profile. With Nazism defeated, other ideational forces of integration surfaced 
as prewar anti-Socialist feelings and activities were invigorated. As an integral part of a general 
fight against economic regulation and for free trade, anti-Socialism became an important integral 
factor among Danish business leaders during the immediate postwar years.  
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Anti-Socialism is as old as Socialism itself. With its combination of forceful utopian ideas of a class 
free society and very tangible and sometimes violent socio-political movements, Socialism always 
posed a serious threat to the existing Capitalist order, and defenders of bourgeois society have 
refrained from few methods when it came to controlling the Socialist threat and the Communist 
variant in particular. After the Russian October Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent rebellions in 
Germany and other European countries, the Communist world movement with the Soviet Union at 
its core established itself as a permanent, leading challenge to Capitalism and liberal democracy, 
overshadowed at times only by traditional rivalries between the major powers of Western Europe. 
The governments of the Western World acted accordingly, from direct military involvement in the 
Soviet civil war 1920-22 to the politics of non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War 1936-39 as the 
legal, but Socialist government was overthrown with the aid of Fascist Germany and Italy, and the 
unofficial support for Finland during the Winter War of 1939-40. During the Cold War, when the 
Soviet Union had emerged as a super power and Eastern Europe had been subjected to the 
supervision of their Soviet Big Brother, anti-Communist activities in “the free world” were 
restricted to domestic registration and surveillance, Berufsverbot and other kinds of persecution, and 
the occasional labour market Communist bashing, led by the Social Democratic controlled labour 
movements. This has now been well described, in particular after the end of the Cold War. 
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Likewise, the cultural climate of the Cold War has been scrutinized.1 What we lack is still an 
assessment of the degree to which the business life and managers took part in the struggle against 
Communism and Socialism. Although officially most of them were politically neutral, it should 
come as no surprise that a great many business managers were in fact engaged in anti-Socialist 
activities and networks. In Denmark’s top business environment, continuity can be established from 
the anti-Bolshevism of the 1920es to the “educational work” of different employers’ associations 
after the Second World War. The purpose of this paper is to establish the outlines of this continuity. 
 
 
2 Fighting Socialism: The Legacy of the Russian Revolution 
 
In Denmark, the parliamentary arena was never the predominant arena for the fight between 
Communists and proponents of the existing social order. The most important struggle took place on 
the labour market, where the Social Democrats did what they could to keep the Communists at bay. 
In this, they were backed by the changing governments, the police, and various employers’ 
associations. 
It should not come as a surprise that the most inveterate anti-socialists among the business leaders were 
people whose dislike of Socialism on a principal level had been intensified by personal experience, 
mostly in the shape of economic loss. Before the First World War, Russia was topping the list of 
Danish overseas industrial investments and the number of Danish companies engaged on the Russian 
market had been considerable.2 The October Revolution did away with the old order and during the 
wave of nationalizations in the summer of 1918 most foreign companies had been expelled and their 
assets seized by the new Bolshevik government. The total value of Danish claims on the Soviet Union 
at this time has been estimated at 400 million DKK (1917), equaling one year’s total Danish state 
revenue and representing app. 50 industrial firms.3 Since 1922, the claims for lost property and other 
economic assets in Russia were put forward by the Association for Safeguarding Danish Claimants’ 
Interests in Russia (the Claimants’ Association). However, since the associations efforts ran contrary to 
                                                            
1 See e.g. Klaus Petersen & Nils Arne Sørensen (eds., 2004), Den kolde krig på hjemmefronten, Odense: University of 
Southern Denmark Press. 
2 Bent Jensen (1973), ”Oktoberrevolutionen og danske erhvervsinteresser i Rusland”, Historie/Jyske Samlinger, Ny 
række vol X, pp. 185-242; Bent Jensen (1979), Købmænd og kommissærer. Oktoberrevolutionen og dansk 
Ruslandspolitik 1917-1924 Copenhagen: Gyldendal. 
3 Bent Jensen (1979), Danmark og det russiske spørgsmål 1917-1924, Aarhus University Press, pp. 45-50; Joachim 
Lund (2001), ”F.L. Smidth & Co. og spørgsmålet om den gamle, konsekvente linie”, Arbejderhistorie 4, pp. 94-120. 
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the Danish government’s policy of rapprochement – Denmark officially acknowledged the Soviet 
Union in 1924 – it all came to nothing.  Only after the German occupation of large parts of Western 
Soviet Union during the Second World War, parts of the Danish claimants’ network was revived. In 
1941-43, in the so-called Eastern Committee of the Danish Foreign Ministry, prominent business 
representatives became actively engaged in the Endeavour to re-establish their companies in those 
territories with the aid of the German occupation authorities.4 
During the war, there had been a sometimes blurred but nevertheless real dividing line between 
resistance hardliners who would put the Allied cause and Denmark’s independence first and on the 
other hand those who always considered Communism a greater threat to Denmark’s societal order than 
Nazism, an ideology which happened, in their view, to be the dominating world view of a basically 
civilized country that was occupying Denmark on a temporary basis. The first category was personified 
by business manager Erling Foss, who played an important role in the resistance, acted as a 
representative of the Danish Freedom Council during negotiations with the Russians in 1944-45, and in 
1950 took part in the official establishment of the anti-Communist Atlantic Association 
(Atlantsammenslutningen) together with other veterans from the resistance in order to promote 
popular backing of NATO, of which Denmark had become a member in 1949.5 
A prominent representative of the second view was Knud Højgaard, who organized an attempt at the 
democratic government in 1940 and later became a member of the Foreign Ministry’s Eastern 
Committee. 
Acknowledging the fact that German Nazism had been far more efficient than any other Western 
society in fighting Communism – and often driven by a general rejection of parliamentary democracy – 
this last group of business leaders would have had few or no restraints in collaborating with German 
authorities and companies during the war. Few of them were full-blown adherents of Nazi ideology. 
                                                            
4 Joachim Lund (2005), Hitlers spisekammer. Danmark og den europæiske nyordning 1940-43, Copenhagen: 
Gyldendal; Joachim Lund (2004), “Denmark and the ‘European New Order’, 1940-1942”, Contemporary European 
History 13, vol. 3, pp. 305-21. 
5 Mogens Rüdiger (2000), Uden tvivl. Erling Foss 1887‐1982, Copenhagen: Gyldendal; Joachim Lund (2008), ”Erling Foss 
– Gunnar Larsen. Firmaet, krigen og ansvaret”, in Hans Kirchhoff (ed.), Sådan valgte de. Syv dobbeltportrætter fra 
besættelsens tid, Copenhagen: Gyldendal, pp. 97‐121; Sarah Von Essen (2003), ”NATO sikrer freden”. 
Atlantsammenslutningen 1950‐1960, master thesis, University of Copenhagen, Department of History. Other anti‐
communist networks and associations emerged after the war; for example, in 1950, CIA secretly founded The Society 
for Freedom and Culture as a Danish division of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. See Ingeborg Philipsen (2004), 
”Out of Tune: The Congress for Cultural Freedom in Denmark 1953‐1960”, in Hans Krabbendam, Giles Scott‐Smith 
(eds.), The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945‐60 (Studies in Intelligence), Routledge. 
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But from their perspective, Europe’s fate was to be decided by the Europeans’ ability to join forces 
against the Bolshevik menace and so to prevent Stalin from subjecting Europe in a spectacular 
Untergang des Abendlandes. In Denmark, they would not have to look to Germany for 
(pseudo)scientific back-up: During the war, Dr. Gudmund Hatt, a well-known professor of geography 
at the University of Copenhagen and Denmark’s only geo-politician, spread his warnings of the Soviet 
threat in the radio and in leading newspapers on a regular basis, and as the war drew to a close, there 
was a growing fear in the political and economic establishment that the Western Allies would advance 
too slowly through Germany and that therefore the Russians would be the ones to liberate Denmark – a 
kind of liberation that was not exactly something to look forward to.6 
At times, self-appointed Communist hunters would offer their services to the employers. For instance, 
in 1939 the Association of Building Contractors was approached by an editor who proposed that the 
association subscribe to a regular flow of information regarding Communist activities within the trade 
unions and in local Communist cells. In the particular case the offer was turned down, not for principal 
reasons, but because the person in question was not known to the board members and therefore did not 
enjoy their trust.7 One preferred to use one’s own people. During the war, for instance, a working 
relationship was established between Minister of Public Works Gunnar Larsen and minister of justice 
Eigil Thune Jacobsen, former national chief of police, in order to infiltrate Communist and Nazi 
environments and obtain intelligence as to the activities of the two. Thune Jacobsen would recruit 
trusted informers and Gunnar Larsen, who also happened to be in charge of Denmark’s largest 
industrial corporation F.L. Smidth & Co., would provide the financial means from his own pocket, in 
order not to involve Parliament committees and the Treasury. After the war and until his retirement in 
1951, the perhaps most prominent police agent in the cooperation of these operations, police sergeant 
Max Weiss, was in charge of the contacts between the police intelligence division and a number of 
private and illegal, armed anti-Communist groupings throughout the country.8 
                                                            
6 Joachim Lund (2007), ’”At opretholde Sindets Neutralitet”. Geografen Gudmund Hatt, det ny Europa og det store 
verdensdrama’, i: John T. Lauridsen (ed.), Over stregen – under besættelsen, Copenhagen: Gyldendal, pp. 242-93. 
7 Archive of the Association of Building Contractors (Copenhagen), board meeting protocols vol. 8, April 21, 1939. 
[Bestyrelsesmøde fredag den 21. april 1939 kl. 10.00. Tilstede: Næstformanden (E. Thorsen), J.C. Halvorsen, K. Hauer, 
Aage Nielsen, H. Otzen, E. Petri, Nøring. Fra kl 11.00: Formanden (T.K. Thomsen). Ad 11. Eventuelt. ”Formanden 
meddelte, at han havde modtaget henvendelse fra en redaktør Christiansen om at Entreprenørforeningen tegnede 
abonnement på oplysninger, som han ved en slags spionage ville skaffe om kommunisternes virksomhed indenfor 
fagforeningerne og i de kommunistiske celler. Efter indhentede oplysninger fra forskellig side om sagen, måtte 
formanden på nuværende tidspunkt fraråde at gå med, og bestyrelsen sluttede sig dertil.”] 
8 Henrik Stevnsborg (2005), ”Weiss, Max L.”, in Hans Kirchhoff, John T. Lauridsen, Aage Trommer (eds.): Hvem var 
hvem 1940-1945, Copenhagen: Gad, p. 382; Morten Heiberg (2009), Stay Behind og Firmaet. PET-Kommissionens 
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The above-mentioned war-time arrangement of infiltrating the Communist environment was approved 
by Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius who was in charge of the relations to the German occupying 
power. This is an ample illustration of the fact that to the government, during the war, the Danish 
Communists were regarded as a serious destabilizing factor in the Danish-German relations, which 
posed a considerable challenge to the balancing abilities of the democratic political parties as steadily 
the Communists gained support during 1942-45. Back in 1940, suffering from a broad Danish support 
for Finland during the Winter War and contempt for the Stalin’s non-aggression pact with Hitler, the 
Danish Communists were still a scorned minority of marginal political significance, and in the summer 
of 1941, following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, leading party members were interned, 
followed by a ban on Communist activity in a constitutional breach that was criticized only by the 
Communists themselves. However, shortly thereafter, the now clandestine Communist Party pioneered 
the industrial sabotage aimed at destroying the government’s policy of cooperation and began 
publishing illegal newspapers. The nationwide general strikes of August 1943 as well as the 
Copenhagen uprising against German repression in the summer of 1944 fully proved what the 
Communists were capable of in terms of mobilizing people at the right time. It was widely believed 
that the clandestine Communist Party was behind the strikes; an interpretation which has been 
confirmed by historical research.9 
Although an extensive cooperation took place in resistance organizations like Frit Danmark (Free 
Denmark) and in the overreaching Freedom Council, this joining of forces was of a tactical character. 
In reality, the struggle between Communists and supporters of the existing societal order, including the 
Social Democrats, went on during the occupation. Most notably, historical research in the 1950s 
revealed that in 1944, a crucial delivery of 3000 Swedish machine guns meant for the resistance never 
reached their destination but instead were distributed among underground military groups in waiting. 
The people in charge of the delivery – representatives of the Danish defense intelligence – would not 
run the risk of arming a potential revolutionary force with automatic weapons in a situation where 
nobody knew if the Communists would attempt a takeover once the Germans had left.10 Likewise, it 
has been shown how The Danish Brigade, a force of app. 3000 volunteers who had come to Sweden as 
refugees and received military training during the war, was meant to be brought into action against a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
beretning vol. 5. Efterretningsvæsen og private antikommunistiske  organisationer i Danmark 1945-1989, Copenhagen: 
PET-Kommissionen, pp. 55; 69; 70; 72. 
9 Hans Kirchhoff (1979), Augustoprøret 1943 I-III, Copenhagen: Gyldendal; Hans Kirchhoff (2001), Samarbejde og 
modstand under besættelsen, Odense: University of Odense Press. 
10 Jørgen Hæstrup (1959), Hemmelig alliance I-II, Copenhagen: Thaning og Appel. 
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potential Communist uprising following the German surrender.11 Officially, every resistance group or 
organization was winded up after the liberation, but in fact, some lived on. The red scare of right wing 
resistance organizations resulted in the establishment of stay-behind networks and the stockpiling of 
weapons. One such group, the Group of 29 August, originated in the Social Democratic resistance 
organization The Ring (Ringen) in 1944. Preparing for a Communist coup d’état, it kept its network 
alive years after the war. Another, The Firm (Firmaet) was set up in 1948 against the background of the 
so-called Easter Crisis when widespread rumours had it that a Soviet invasion was imminent. The 
Firm’s leader, Arne Sejr, had been among the pioneers of the right wing part of the resistance 
movement. In the 1950s, The Firm carried out “black operations”, i.e. surveillance tasks in 
coordination with CIA, MI6 and the intelligence division of the Danish defense.12 
The world view of these groups was an easy black-white one. They had fought Nazism; now they were 
fighting Communism. If we turn to the employer’s networks, the situation was more complicated. 
They had always treated the Communists like a serious threat, and in this they had been able to join 
forces with the dominating, Social Democratic part of the labour movement. Now, in 1945, the Social 
Democrats were under heavy pressure from totalitarian movement on their left wing. The successful 
mobilization for the general strikes of 1943 and 1944 and backed by a general decline in living 
standards among the working population of the big cities as well as the massive war effort of the Soviet 
Union, the Communists gained in support, and in the election of October 1945, the popularity of the 
party culminated in a dramatic victory, winning 12.5 percent of the votes (in contrast to the 2.4 percent 
won in the last free elections of April 1939). This confirmed the employer’s worst fears. In an attempt 
to curb the Communist success, the Social Democratic Party in 1945 presented a programme that 
called for permanent state control in imports and extensive “socializations”, i.e. nationalizations, of 
crucial parts of Denmark’s industry and financial sector. There were even informal talks going on with 
a view to the unification of the Communist and Social Democratic parties – although few were 
convinced that those talks should be taken seriously. 
Right wing political parties and employer’s associations therefore faced a double threat after the 
liberation of 1945. So far, they had to a large extent left the struggle against the Communists with the 
                                                            
11 Knud J.V. Jespersen (1993), Brigaden. Den danske Brigade i Sverige 1943-1945, Copenhagen: Gyldendal. 
12 Jacob Krumnes (2004), ”Historien om historien om ”Firmaet”, in Klaus Petersen, Nils Arne Sørensen (eds., 2004), pp. 
219‐32; Peer Henrik Hansen (2005), Firmaets største bedrift. Den hemmelige krig mod de danske kommunister, 
Copenhagen: Høst & Søn; Peer Henrik Hansen (2006), ”Firmaet, DKP og de sorte breve”, Arbejderhistorie. Tidsskrift for 
Historie, kultur og politik, 1; Peer Henrik Hansen  (2007), Da yankee’erne kom til Danmark. Fra Verdenskrig til Kold Krig 
– den amerikanske efterretningstjeneste og Danmark, 1943‐1946, diss., University of Roskilde; Morten Heiberg (2009), 
pp. 54‐61 and 100‐124. 
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Social Democrats in a struggle that had mostly taken place within the trade unions. Now, the Social 
Democrats were themselves turning left, arguing for a planned economy. Much to the relief of the 
economic élite, after a campaign that included fierce attacks on the regulated economy, the elections of 
October 1945 put a liberal government in power. 
 
3 The Trades and Industries’ Information Council, 1945-1970 
The employers had mobilized early in 1945. It has been suggested that the establishment of The Trades 
and Industries’ Information Council (TIIC) was a reaction to another economic think tank, the Trades 
and Industries Council of the Workers Movement, which was founded in 1936 and exercised a 
considerable influence on the Social Democratic governments.13 However, according to its official 
history, TIIC was founded on the background of the left wing turn of Danish politics at the end of the 
occupation. The main purpose of TIIC was to fight the tendency towards nationalization and a planned 
economy, to get rid of economic regulation (import regulation in particular) and to promote the value 
of private enterprise to society in general. In early spring 1945, business people managed to put 
together a group, which already in August could publicly announce itself as TIIC. The fast progress of 
the work was urged by the announcement of the Danish Social Democratic Party new programme in 
the summer of 1945 and the approaching parliamentary elections. Stated the official history of TIIC in 
1970,  
“First and foremost it was a question of getting started. The situation was critical, also 
from the point of view of the Social Democrats. In the days of Stauning [Social 
Democratic premier, 1929-42], the Communists had always been rejected as splinter 
people, dependent on the Soviet Union. In the resistance during the war, the Communists 
had become like brothers, among other reasons because after the German aggression the 
Soviet Union had joined the Allies. Now, the Communists had become salonfähig, with 
representatives in the coalition government and with a certain glory owing to the ban 
against the party during the war. The Social Democrats feared for a loss of votes to the 
Communists in the approaching elections (...) a by no means irrelevant reason for the 
radicalization of the [Social Democratic] programme in a socialist direction had been the 
                                                            
13 www.cepos.dk (29.7.2009) 
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wish to be able to declare that the claims of the Communists were already to be found in 
the programme of the Social Democrats (...)”14 
Writing with 25 years distance, perhaps the author was guilty of overrating the influence of the new 
TIIC as he went on: 
“The elections were approaching – elections for and against socialization [i.e. 
nationalizations]. Everyone was expecting TIIC to make an effort which might have a 
decisive significance and prevent a Socialist majority.”15 
In any case, TIIC quickly produced a pamphlet Frihed og Fremtid [Freedom and Future], which was 
printed in 1.250.000 copies and distributed to every household in the country. Emphasizing the 
advantages of a liberal economy, the pamphlet warned against state bureaucracy and a planned 
economy and stated that the elections were basically a matter of choosing between freedom and 
coercion.  
The elections produced a liberal government. Many years later, TIIC took at least a part of the honour 
for the Socialists’ defeat when it stated that the Social Democrats had lost because someone – meaning 
TIIC – had taken responsibility for analyzing and criticizing the party programme and revealing its 
consequences to the voters.16 After the elections,  TIIC launched a permanent campaign in the shape of 
press releases, directed at specific newspapers, which was a new – and at the time very aggressive – 
way of disseminating ideas in Denmark, with the aim of permanently influencing the public opinion 
and decision-makers. People should be provided with knowledge about the business conditions, and 
“certain misconceptions indoctrinated by political propaganda” should be set right.17 
TIIC’s purposeful press work also led the way to the microphones of Danish radio (which at the time 
consisted of one channel). During an interview about the emerging post-war industries in Denmark, the 
eager secretary of TIIC, Christian Gandil, had prepared a little speech on the importance of free 
enterprise, when he was interrupted by the interviewer: 
Gandil: ”Exactly in a situation like the present one, with a picture that changes so very quickly, I 
attach an enormous significance to making room for private initiative, to the greatest possible 
extent. Denmark’s commercial future depends to a predominant extent on the loosening of the 
                                                            
14 Christian Gandil (1970), Erhvervenes Oplysningsråd 1945-1970, Copenhagen, p. 14. Author’s translation. 
15 Ibid., p. 21. 
16 Ibid., p. 22. 
17 Ibid., p. 50. 
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trammels that currently constrict our trades, so that the individual can fully bring out his abilities, 
skills, and love of working.” 
Interviewer: “Yes, well, now we’re getting on to politics, and that wasn’t really the idea. We were 
supposed to hear about Denmark’s new industries. So let’s stay with the individual and his abilities 
and skills and love of working (...)”18 
Information campaigns were the objective of TIIC. So far, there is no evidence that TIIC was used in 
the surveillance efforts against the Communists. A recently published investigation of the Danish 
police intelligence service’s surveillance and registration of political opponents 1945-89 did not reveal 
any links between the service and employer’s associations including the TIIC, although the documents 
show that when the intelligence service was reorganized in 1950/51, a government committee had 
indeed suggested that contacts be established between the service and the trades and industries. Instead, 
PET made direct contacts with several large business corporations and, moreover, received information 
on Communist shop stewards and party representatives at the factories from local Social Democrats or 
from the Workers’ Information Central Arbejderbevægelsens Informations Central; AIC), which had 
been established exactly in order to register leading Communists on the labour market.19 
Over the years, and until its dissolution in 1974, TIIC systematically provided newspapers with a huge 
amount of material about the trades and industries. Thus, in 1946-69, more than 180.000 feature 
articles, hard facts and statistics produced by TIIC were published in Danish newspapers.20 TIIC also 
published books and pamphlets, but this was on a smaller scale; examples are Christian Gandil 
(secretary of TIIC 1945-49; director from 1949), Moderne liberalisme (1948); John Jewkes (professor, 
Oxford), Planøkonomiens dilemma (1950), Christian Gandil, Hvorfor stiger priserne? [Why Do the 
Prizes Rise?] (1966), Erik Lundberg, Den statslige stabiliseringspolitiks vanskeligheder: erfaringer fra 
forskellige lande [Difficulties of State Stabilization of the Economy: Experiences from Different 
                                                            
18 “Netop i en situation som den foreliggende, hvor billedet skifter så overordentlig hurtigt, så tillægger jeg det meget 
stor betydning, at der i så vid udstrækning som muligt åbnes plads for det private initiativ. Danmarks erhvervsmæssige 
fremtid beror i ganske overvejende grad på, at de snærende bånd, der for øjeblikket hviler på vort erhvervsliv, bliver 
løsnet efterhånden, således at den enkeltes evner, dygtighed og arbejdslyst kommer til fuld udfoldelse.” ”Ja, nu er vi ved 
at komme ind på politik, og det er jo ikke rigtig meningen. Det, vi skulle høre lidt om, det var de nye danske industrier. 
Så derfor bliver vi ved de enkelte og deres evner og deres dygtighed og arbejdslyst – det, vi kaldte hitte-påsomhed før, 
ikke sandt (...)” Danish Radio, on Denmark’s new industries, February 26, 1947. www.dr.dk/bonanza  
19 Klaus Petersen, Regin Schmidt (2001), ”Gemensam nordisk front – de skandinaviske/nordiske socialdemokratiske 
arbejderbevægelser og deres anti-kommunistiske samarbejde under den kolde krig”, Arbetarhistoria vol. 25, pp. 22-25; 
Regin Schmidt (2009), PETs overvågning af arbejdsmarkedet 1945-1989. Fra samarbejde til overvågning. AIC, 
fagbevægelsen og faglige konflikter under den kolde krig. PET-Kommissionens beretning vol. 8 (Copenhagen: PET-
Kommissionen, pp. 47-48; 84-90. 
20 Ibid., p. 43. 
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Countries] (1966), and Jørgen Pedersen (professor of economics), Markedsøkonomi eller 
tvangsøkonomi [Market Economy or Restrained Economy] (1971). 
The second branch of TIIC’s work consisted in the organization of lectures. The idea was to have just 
one or two lectures a year, inviting internationally well-known economists or business people. A 
random selection from the list speaks for itself: Friedrich Hayek (“The Future of Liberalism”, 1946), 
Wilhelm Röpke (“The Crisis of Collectivism”, 1947 and “Freeing International Trade”, 1953), Herbert 
Tingsten (“Freedom in Politics”, 1948), Northcote Parkinson (“On Taxes”, 1960), and Charles Hambro 
(“International Economic Cooperation”, 1966). A lecture by German minister of Economy Ludwig 
Erhard in May 1958 (“European Economic Cooperation”) attracted an audience of 1200. 
From the beginning in 1945, TIIC was split between agrarian export interests and import interests of 
the shopkeepers on the one hand and industrial interests on the other, favoring a greater degree of 
protectionism. TIIC’s close connections with the liberal agrarians in Knud Kristensen Liberal party 
(in government 1945-47 and 1950-53) points to this fact. When the Industrial Council finally 
withdrew from the Trades and Industries’ Information Council in 1949, it was a serious blow from 
which it never fully recovered. In 1974, the main sponsors of TIIC withdrew their support and TIIC 
was dissolved. The remaining funds were transferred to a like-minded association, Libertas: 
Næringsliv og Samfund [Economic Life and Society]. 
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